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ABSTRACT
Case histories have played an important role in guiding development of geotechnical engineering during a time when theory was not
sophisticated enough to model even simple problems with an acceptable level of rigor. As the discipline transitions from
overwhelming reliance on empiricism to a greater reliance on science, it is useful to reexamine the best known case histories as a
general check on modern methods of analysis. In the engineering of foundations in clay, three case histories  the collapses of the
Transcona and Fargo grain elevators and the near collapse of the leaning tower of Pisa  stand out. We will see that limit analysis,
which is a method of analysis based on two theorems from plasticity theory that allow bounding the collapse load from above and
below, produces collapse load estimates that match closely the estimated collapse loads for the two failed grain elevators. It does so
without giving the analyst much latitude in selection of input parameters, not requiring the elaborate assumptions needed when
attempts are made to use an excessively simplified theory to analyze a real problem. We will also show, using the problem of a
leaning tower, how resort to a complete analysis of a boundary-value problem, using a method like the finite element method, is
sometimes required in determining the critical ultimate limit state.

INTRODUCTION
Proper design of foundations requires a strong basis on
mechanics but should also be corroborated by the satisfactory
performance of foundations. Well documented case histories
are useful in such corroboration. Experiments also allow us to
compare predicted and measured foundation response;
however, experiments are often restricted to model tests or to
single-element tests (such as the load test of a pile). In
contrast, case histories that are sufficiently rich in details
allow comparisons with simulations of entire foundationstructure systems, adding a measure of realism to the
validation of analyses and design methods.
Not every case history needs to be a complete account of
successful or unsuccessful design and construction of a
structure. Unfortunately, real structures are rarely
instrumented and soil profile characterization is rarely done so
completely that a traditional case history can be useful to a
complete validation of a theoretical analysis. While a
traditional case history informs, may reveal serious missteps
or, more rarely, may reveal a limit state that is surprising and
not typically considered in design, it rarely serves as
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validation of a theoretical method of analysis.
In this paper, we focus on the combination of case histories
with science-based methods of analysis as a powerful way of
advancing methods of design. We will explore two cases of
bearing capacity failure (the collapse of grain elevators in
Transcona and Fargo), discuss an alternative collapse limit
state (leaning stability) that threatened the Tower of Pisa. To
all cases, we apply modern methods of analysis.
By selecting case histories of historical relevance to
geotechnical engineering, we illustrate how our progress in
developing predictive methods based on the mechanics of
soils and structures can be tested by analysis of case histories.
We conclude the paper by laying out some principles
regarding both the planning of detailed field experiments and
for using case histories usefully in the testing and validation of
predictive methods.

1

THEORETICAL METHODS

Limit Analysis
It has been roughly sixty years since Drucker, Greenberg and
Prager (1951) published their ground-breaking lower and
upper bound theorems of plasticity theory, on which limit
analysis is based. Limit analysis always had the potential to
produce excellent solutions to collapse problems, typified in
soil mechanics by the bearing capacity problem. However, the
numerical techniques required for finding very close lower
and upper bounds on collapse loads, thus closely defining the
collapse loads, were not available until very recently.
Limit analysis takes advantage of the lower and upper bound
theorems of plasticity theory to bound the rigorous solution to
a stability problem from below and above. The lower bound
theorem states that collapse does not occur for a statically
admissible stress field - a stress field that is stable (i.e., does
not violate the yield criterion at any point) and statically
admissible (i.e., is in equilibrium with the surface traction and
body forces). This can be written in the form of the virtual
work equation as:
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where  ijL = statically admissible stress field in equilibrium
with the tractions Ti L and the body forces X iL ; ij = actual
stress field; ij = actual strain rate field; vi = actual velocity
field; and D( ij ) is the plastic dissipation associated with the
strain rate field ij . It should be noted that, in the lower
bound theorem, only the equilibrium condition and the stress
boundary conditions are satisfied. No kinematics is taken into
account.
The upper bound theorem states that collapse is either
imminent or already underway for a kinematically admissible
velocity (or strain rate) field – a velocity field which is both
unstable [i.e., the rate of external work calculated from the
velocity (or strain rate) field exceeds or equals the internal
power dissipation)] and kinematically admissible (i.e., the
velocity field satisfies the velocities specified at the boundary
of the soil mass). This can be written as follows:
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strain rate field ijU . The upper bound theorem satisfies the
flow rule, the compatibility condition and the velocity
boundary conditions, but not the equilibrium condition or
traction boundary conditions. In (1) and (2), the inequalities
are due to the principle of maximum power dissipation. The
stress fields in (1) and (2) are in terms of effective stresses
since power is dissipated only through the soil skeleton.
Finite element limit analysis combines the limit theorems with
finite elements to produce a discrete mathematical
programming problem. The numerical formulations used in
this investigation originate from those developed by Sloan
(1988, 1989), but has evolved significantly over the past two
decades to incorporate the major improvements described in
Lyamin and Sloan (2002a, 2002b) and Krabbenhoft et al.
(2005, 2007). In brief, these formulations use linear stress
(lower bound) and linear velocity (upper bound) triangular
finite elements to discretize the soil mass. In contrast to
conventional displacement finite element analysis, each node
in limit analysis mesh is unique to a particular element so that
statically admissible stress (in the lower bound case) and
kinematically admissible velocity discontinuities (in the upper
bound case) are possible along shared edges between two
adjacent elements. Both formulations result in convex
mathematical programs, which (considering the dual form of
the upper bound problem) can be cast in the following form:

maximize 
subject to Aσ  p0  p
fi (σ)  0, i  {1,

(3)

, N}

where λ is a load multiplier,  is a vector of stress variables, A
is a matrix of equality constraint coefficients, p0 and p are
vectors of prescribed and optimizable forces, fi is the yield
function for stress set i, and N is the number of stress nodes.
The solutions to problem (1) can be found efficiently by using
general Interior-Point methods (IPM) or specialised conic
optimization solvers (SOCP).
The end product of the optimization problem is the stress field
leading to the maximum lower bound to the collapse load and
the velocity (displacement) field consistent with the lowest
upper bound to the collapse load achievable with the finite
element mesh used in the analysis. If these two bounds are
close enough, the collapse load is rather precisely known. As
we will see, that is always the case with 2D computations. In
3D computations, it is known that the lower bound is closer to
the collapse load than the upper bound is.

V

where viU = kinematically admissible velocity field compatible
with the strain rate field ijU ;  ijU = stress field in equilibrium
with the upper bound loading TiU and X iU ; ij = actual stress
field; and D( ijU ) is the plastic dissipation associated with the
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CASE HISTORY Ⅰ: TRANSCONA GRAIN ELEVATOR
FAILURE, 1913

The Structure, the Failure and the Soil Profile
The Canadian Pacific Railway Company started construction
of the Transcona Grain Elevator in 1911 in North Transcona, 7
miles northeast of Winnipeg, Canada, and roughly 230 miles
north of Fargo, North Dakota. Construction ended in
September 1913. The elevator was composed of a reinforced
concrete work house and a bin house, which were connected
by a bridge and conveyor belt. The conveyor belt operated in a
low cupola at the top of the bin-house. The work house was
21.3 m wide, 29.3 m long and 54.9 m tall and rested on a raft
foundation with base located 3.66 m below the ground surface.
The bin house had five rows of 13 bins and was constructed
on a reinforced-concrete raft foundation that was 23.5 m wide
and 59.4 m long and had the base placed also at a depth of
3.66 m. The thickness of this mat foundation was 0.6 m. The
bins were 28.0 m in height and 4.27 m in diameter. Fig. 1
shows a plan view and a photo of the structure.

Before construction of the grain elevator, the only test known
to have been performed was a plate load test at the design
depth of the foundation. The bearing soil was deemed similar
to soil found in the Winnipeg area, on which tall structures
had been erected. The notion that the depth of influence of a
plate load test is tied to the size of the plate may not have been
well understood at the time; as a result, the effect of a weaker
clay layer located below the shallower, relatively stiff clay
layer on which the plate load test was performed was not
contemplated.
After construction, operations started; the amount of grains
was approximately evenly distributed between the bins. On
October 18, 1913, settlement of the bin house was first
observed (Allaire, 1916). There were 875,000 bushels of
wheat in the elevator at that moment, corresponding to a load
of 231,400 kN. If we combine these 231,400 kN with the dead
weight of the structure, a total load of 409,400 kN was applied
at the base of the raft. Considering these loads to have been
distributed uniformly over the raft foundation, the applied load
on the mat foundation could be estimated as 293 kPa.
As soon as settlement started, it increased steadily, but slowly,
to about 0.30 m within an hour. After that, the structure tilted
toward the west during the next 24 hours until its lean was 26
degrees, 53 minutes from the vertical. A 7.5-9.0 m wide strip
of ground on the east side of the bin-house bulged up about
1.2-1.5 m (except on the south side, where the work house was
located), while the west side settled as much as 9 m below its
original level (Fig. 2). As the photos in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 attest,
all of this happened slowly enough that White (1953) could
take photographs during the event and have an accurate
recollection of what happened.

(a)

Fig. 2 The collapse of the Transcona Grain Elevator (White,
1953). Used with permission from ICE Publishing.

(b)
Fig. 1 The Transcona grain elevator: (a) the elevator
foundation plan and (b) the structure before collapse (after
White, 1953). Used with permission from ICE Publishing.
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After the failure, several wash borings were made near the site
that showed that rather uniform deposits of clay existed
beneath the bin house and elevator. In 1951, there were
additional borings performed near the work house. As a result,
it was found that the ground was mainly composed of two
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thick clay layers. The unit weights of these layers were taken
as 18.8 kN/m3 by Peck and Bryant (1953). The ground water
level was located at a depth of 2.56m in boring No. 1. By
testing undisturbed samples from different depths, the
unconfined compressive strength, natural water content and
liquid and plastic limits were obtained for different layers and
are shown in Table 1. Using half of the unconfined
compressive strength values obtained, the undrained shear
strength profile with depth could be estimated as shown in Fig.
3 . The locations of borings No. 1 and No. 2 are shown in Fig.
1(a). The lines in Fig. 3 represent the shear strength profile
used in the analysis of this failure, discussed next.
The undrained shear strength su was assumed constant with
depth within each of the layers identified in Fig. 3; the vertical
lines in this figure represent the values of su assumed in the
analysis for each layer, which are given numerically in Table 2.
The layer of fractured limestone was treated as a frictional
material. A high friction angle, of as much as 50 degrees,
would likely be appropriate for the fractured limestone.
Analyses show, however, that even a layer with friction angle
as low as fifteen degrees would deflect the slip mechanism up
into the overlying clay, so characterization of the fractured
limestone turns out not to be critical to the results of the
analysis (and the friction angle is noted as greater than 15
degrees in Table 2).

Table 1. Soil profile of the Transcona elevator case
Layer
No.

1

Depth
(m)

0-9.10

2

9.10-12.6

Description

Clay

Clay

3

12.6-15.2

Clay and
gravel

4

15.2-16.5

Fractured
limestone

Properties
Unit weight
(kN/m3)
Average water
content (%)
LL (%)
PL (%)
Unit
weight
(kN/m3)
Average water
content (%)
LL (%)
PL (%)
Unit
weight
(kN/m3)
Unit
weight
(kN/m3)
ϕ ( o)

18.8
45
105
35
18.8
57
105
35
18.8
19
>15

Table 2 The value of undrained shear strength for each soil
layer below the Transcona elevator foundation.
Layer
No.
1
2
3
4

Depth (m)

Undrained shear strength (kPa)

0-2
9.1-12.6
12.6-15.2
15.2-16.5

55.5
32.6
20.3
Treated as frictional

Reassessment of the Case History using Modern Methods

Fig. 3 Undrained shear strength with depth (based on borings
No. 1 and No. 2).
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We will start by analyzing the Transcona elevator collapse
using 2D limit analysis. 2D analysis would be suitable for a
plane-strain problem (one in which the shear strain
components in one plane and the strain component normal to
that plane are all zero). Assumption of plane strain is a
frequent assumption in soil mechanics, even when it does not
strictly apply. Every problem is in fact three-dimensional; the
cross section of the problem in this case refers to the cross
section corresponding to the smaller plan dimension (the
width B of the foundation). Fig. 4 shows the finite element
mesh used for the 2D limit analyses. Fig. 5 shows the same
mesh distorted after collapse (in truth, an image based on the
velocities at failure and thus on the last displacement
increments), and Fig. 6 shows the plastic energy dissipation as
a result of the collapse. Both the distorted mesh and the plot of
energy dissipation show where shearing localized at collapse.
The distorted mesh does not represent accumulated
displacement but rather results from scaling up the
incremental displacements at collapse, giving a qualitative
view of slip pattern at collapse. The lower bound on the unit
limit load was 284 and the upper bound was 296 kPa. Since
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the estimated unit load at the time of collapse is 293 kPa, there
appears to be a good match; however, neither our estimates of
shear strength nor the estimate of load at the time of collapse
is free of error. Additionally, the foundation is not long
enough with respect to its width for the problem to
approximate a plane-strain problem. Accordingly, we also
performed 3D limit analysis of the same problem.

the bounds compared with that for the 2D analysis reflects the
greater challenges of a 3D analysis. Comparisons of 3D finite
element limit analysis with the solutions of problems that can
be solved exactly (such as by Salgado et al. 2004 and Lyamin
et al. 2007) show that the lower bound is significantly closer
to the collapse load, so that we can expect the collapse load, as
calculated using 3D FELA to be of the order of 320-330 kPa,
less than 10% greater than the estimated load at collapse.
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Fig. 4 Two-dimensional (plane-strain) mesh for the Transcona
elevator.
Fig. 7 Three-dimensional mesh for the Transcona elevator.
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Fig. 5 Distorted two-dimensional (plane-strain) mesh for the
Transcona elevator.
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Fig. 8 Distorted three-dimensional (plane-strain) mesh for the
Y
X
Transcona elevator.
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Fig. 6 Contours of plastic power dissipation from the twodimensional (plane-strain) analysis of the Transcona elevator
failure.
The mesh for the 3D analysis is shown in Fig. 7, the distorted
mesh in Fig. 8, and the power dissipation plot in Fig. 9. The
resulting lower and upper bounds on limit unit bearing
capacity are 310 and 376 kPa. The larger difference between
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Fig. 9 Contours of plastic power dissipation from the threedimensional (plane-strain) analysis of the Transcona elevator
failure.
The advantage of using an analysis that is rigorous and
requires no assumption to make it applicable to the problem at

5

hand is that the only judgment that is required regards the
values of shear strength to use in the analysis. The geometry is
set and is easily input into the analysis. The estimated collapse
load based on the amount of grain believed to be in the
elevators at the time of collapse is subject to some uncertainty,
so the difference of the order of 10% between calculated and
observed bearing capacity is quite satisfactory. To put this
comparison in perspective, Peck and Bryant (1953) used the
bearing capacity equation proposed by Skempton (1951)
which already contained early forms of shape and depth
factors to estimate the collapse load. The equation that they
used was:
B 
D

net
qn  qbL
 N c cu  5 1  1 
 cu
 5L  5B 

(4)

In order to use this equation, they needed to estimate a value
of shear strength that would represent the entire soil mass,
since it does not allow for layered soil, which of course
requires considerable judgment. Peck and Bryant (1953) used
two values of shear strength: a weighted average value of the
undrained shear strength over the total thickness of the clay
layers and the smallest shear strength for all layers. The effect
of the strength of fractured limestone was neglected. A
bearing capacity of 314 kPa, which is 7.2% greater than the
observed unit load at collapse, was calculated using the
average shear strength. Use of the smallest undrained shear
strength produced a value of 240 kPa, which is 18% lower
than the collapse unit load.
Since the variation of shear strength with depth affects the
depth and shape of the slip mechanism in a way that cannot be
foreseen without a suitable method of analysis (Salgado 2008),
this is typically a difficult estimate to make based on judgment
and without the aid of a more sophisticated method of analysis.
Another element of uncertainty regarding the shear strength is
that, based on the tests on samples from a limited number of
borings, we established a depth profile of shear strength and
assumed no variation of it in the horizontal direction. Lastly,
given the composition of the clay at the site, with a
nonnegligible percentage of montmorillonite, for example, its
residual friction angle should be lower than its critical-state
friction angle, which would suggest that some degree of
progressive failure might have played a small role in the
failure. This would be consistent with our collapse load
estimated being slightly greater than the load believed to have
been applied to the foundations at the time of collapse.

miles west of Fargo, North Dakota (located in roughly the
same geologic setting and 230 miles south of Transcona). It
consisted of 20 circular bins that were arranged in two rows of
10 bins each and attached structures (Fig. 10(a) and (b)). The
height and inside diameter of the bins were 37.2 m and 5.8 m.
This structure rested on a reinforced concrete raft foundation
that was 15.8 m wide, 66.4 m long and 0.71m thick. The outer
0.91 m edge around the structure was thickened to 1.32m.
Except for this thickened edge, the base of the foundation was
located 1.83 m below the ground surface. The raft foundation
was interrupted locally by tunnels. There were also sheet piles
that had been installed around the foundation; they should
have had negligible effect on the performance of the raft.
Until fall of 1954, only a small amount of grain had been
stored in the elevator. The first time the elevator was filled
with a large quantity of grain was April, 1955. Filling started
then, and, in the early morning of June 12, 1955, the elevator
collapsed and disintegrated. On May 10, 1955, after major
filling had started, seven elevation benchmarks were installed,
and the settlements of the foundation were recorded together
with applied loads once a week after that. Fig. 11 shows the
resulting load-settlement curve. The collapse happened when
the unit load at failure was estimated at 260 kPa, with an
estimated eccentricity of 0.96 m west and 0.03 m south from
the centroid of the raft. Subtracting the weight of the 1.8m of
soil excavated from the site, the net unit load at the time of
failure was approximately 228 kPa. Failure produced a mass
of concrete debris and grain on the north side of the original
location of the structure. The ground bulged up as much as
1.83 m on the south side of the structure.
After collapse, three borings were performed at the site:
boring No. 1 and 3 in zones largeky unaffected by the collapse
and boring No. 2 in a zone disturbed by the collapse (Fig. 10
(b) shows the locations of the three borings). They revealed
that the soil profile below the structure had three clay layers
and one thin sand layer.
The undrained shear strength depth profile in the clay layers
was estimated from the results of the field vane tests. In
arriving at shear strength values from vane measurements, it is
important to take into account rate effects, which increase with
plasticity index (PI) (Bjerrum, 1972). Azzouz et al. (1983)
suggested a correction factor that includes end effects, which
would lead to an overestimate of shear strength if ignored. The
undrained shear strength can then be obtained by multiplying
the shear strength measured with the field vane by that
correction factor.

CASE HISTORY II: FARGO GRAIN ELEVATOR, 1955

The Structure, the Failure and the Soil Profile
The Fargo grain elevator was a reinforced concrete grain
elevator built during the summer and fall of 1954 about two
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(a)

For the bottom clay layer, a credible range for dsu/d'v was
established based on the available CU test results, and this
value optimized (resulting equal to 0.17) to best fit the vane
test results. The natural water content, the density and the
liquid and plastic limits were also obtained for various depths
within each of the layers. The highest plasticity index
observed for each clay layer was used to estimate the
correction factor from Fig. 12, resulting in values of 0.75 for
layer 1, 0.7 for layer 2 and 0.62 for layer 4. For the sand layer,
only SPT results are available (Fig. 13 and Table 3). The
ground water level was located at the depth of 1.90m.
Although the borings extended down to a depth of
approximately 20 meters, we know that, in this area of the
country, glacial till is found at depths of approximately 30
meters and sound rock at depths exceeding 60 meters. On that
basis, in Fig. 13, we have extended the shear strength observed
down to a depth of 30 meters, where glacial till then begins.
The shear strength profile used in our analysis of this failure is
indicated in Fig. 13 through straight line segments; it is given
numerically in Table 4.
Reassessment of the Case History using Modern Methods
Previous attempts to analyze this case history relied on the
bearing capacity equation (Nordlund and Deere 1970).
Different forms of the bearing capacity equation are applicable
to clay with su that is either constant or increases linearly with
depth (Salgado 2008); the present soil profile cannot be fit into
either of these cases. An additional deviation is the presence of
the sand layer. Nordlund and Deere (1970), like Peck and
Bryant (1953), used the Skempton (1951) bearing capacity
equation.

(b)
Fig. 10 Fargo Grain Elevator: (a) Section view (b) Plan view.

Fig. 11 Unit load versus settlement.
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The friction angle for the sand layer was assumed as 25
degrees, a value that is clearly too low based on present
knowledge of sand behavior. The slip surface was assumed to
reach down to a depth of 2B/3 below the base of the footing.
The method of slices was used to evaluate the shear strength
of the sand layer. A weighted average of the shear strength
between the base of the footing and the depth of 2B/3 below
the base was used to calculate the bearing capacity. Nordlund
and Deere (1970) explored three methods of estimating shear
strength: from unconfined compressive tests on untrimmed
samples, from field vane tests and from field vane tests with
correction for progressive failure. The calculated unit limit
bearing capacities were 229kPa, 344 kPa and 281 kPa;
respectively, 12% lower, 32% higher and 8% higher than the
collapse load. This means that an attempt to estimate the load
at collapse, even with the foreknowledge of the right answer,
using the traditional bearing capacity equation would yield an
uncertainty of about 44% (minus 12% to plus 32%) of the
collapse load. The progressive failure correction relied on
taking mobilized shear strengths at the same levels of strain as
estimated from laboratory tests. Load eccentricity was ignored.

7

Layer No.

Table 3 Soil profile of the Fargo Grain Elevator case

Fig. 12 Field vane correction factor (after Azzouz et al., 1983).
We have again used limit analysis to bound the collapse load
from below and above. Starting with plane-strain analysis, Fig.
14 shows the mesh used in the analyses. Fig. 15 shows the soil
mass distortion at collapse, and Fig. 16 shows the power
dissipation throughout the soil mass. Both of these figures
give an indication of the nature of the deformation associated
with collapse. The lower bound limit unit bearing capacity
ranged from 290 to 295 kPa as we varied the friction angle of
the sand layer between 30 and 34 degrees, a credible range for
loose sand.

Depth (m)

Description

Properties
 (kN/m3)
(%)
LL (%)
PL (%)
 (kN/m3)
wc (%)
LL (%)
PL (%)
wc (%)
NSPT
 (kN/m3)

1

0-1.52

Silty clay

2

1.52-4.45

Stratified
clay and
silt

3

4.45-6.30

Loose sand

6.30-7.70

Desiccated
clay crust

wc (%)

Clay

LL (%)
PL (%)
Sensitivity

4
7.70-30

17.29
30.5
75
30
17.29
43.2
40-90
30
31.9
5-13
14.93
47.2 (6.1-7.7)
65 (7.7-19.51)
105-115
37
4

Note: wc = average water content;  = unit weight

Table 4 Shear strength profile
Layer
No.
1
2
3

Depth
(m)
0-1.52
1.52-4.45
4.45-6.30
6.30-7.70
7.70-30

4

su or 
29.3-82.0 kPa (linear increase)
57.7 kPa
 = 30-34o
42.8-71.7 kPa (linearly increase)
32.6-51.8 kPa (linearly increase)
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Fig. 14 Two-dimensional (plane-strain) mesh for the Fargo
elevator.
Fig. 13 Shear Strength with depth (Boring No. 1, 2 and 3).
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Fig. 17 shows the 3D mesh. Fig. 18 and Fig. 19 provide
indications of the deformation field within the soil at collapse.
The lower bound was calculated as 310 kPa, and the upper
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bound as 378 kPa. As indicated earlier, the collapse load is
expected to be much closer to the lower bound. This leaves
our lower bound estimate about 15% higher than the estimated
load at the time of collapse.
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Fig. 17 Three-dimensional mesh for the Fargo elevator.
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Fig. 15 Distorted two-dimensional (plane-strain) mesh for the
Fargo elevator.
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Fig. 18 Distorted three-dimensional (plane-strain) mesh for
the Fargo elevator.
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Fig. 16 Contours of plastic power dissipation from the twodimensional (plane-strain) analysis of the Fargo elevator
failure.

Fig. 19 Contours of plastic power dissipation from the threedimensional (plane-strain) analysis of the Fargo elevator
failure.
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LEANING STABILITY

The Tower of Pisa Case History
The Tower of Pisa case history has been well covered in the
literature. We follow here Salgado (2008) and provide only a
summary of the essential facts needed for the focus of our
discussion: the use of modern analysis methods to ascertain
the controlling limit state for the Tower of Pisa. The
discussion is largely based on work by Burland Potts (2003),
The Tower of Pisa is located in the city of Pisa, in Tuscany,
Italy. The city is located on the Arno River, northwest of
Rome. The Tower stands 54m tall and weighs 142,000 kN.
The foundation is a spread foundation in the form of a hollow
cylinder with outer diameter equal to 19.58m and inner
diameter equal to 4.47m (Mitchell et al 1977). The hollow
space appears to have been filled with rubble and mortar at the
time of construction (Burland et al. 2003).
Construction of the Pisa Tower to its present height was done
in several stages in the course of centuries. The first stage
extended from 1173 to 1178. No construction activity took
place during the next century. Construction was restarted in
1272, lasting until 1278. By 1272, it was evident that the
Tower had started to lean, and masons attempted to correct for
the leaning by placing stones on plumb (along a vertical
alignment), not according to the Tower alignment. Because of
this, the Tower is curved, much like a banana. Another
century passed, and, in 1370, construction was completed after
another decade of work. It is estimated that the lean of the
Tower at that time was 3.5 degrees, corresponding to an
angular distortion equal to 0.061 or approximately 1/16.
The tower is located on top of 300m of sediments deposited
both by the Arno river and by the sea, at the time when the
city was located in a coastal lagoon. Focusing on the layers
nearer to the ground surface, the Tower rests on about 9
meters of dense river silts underlain by approximately 30
meters of marine clay. The foundations of the tower are
shallow, approximately 20m in diameter and 3m in depth.
Because the silt layer was more compressible on the south side
of the Tower, the settlement developed faster there than on the
north side, resulting in the Tower present inclination.
It is interesting to note the reason why no bearing capacity
failure ever occurred. The century-long waiting periods
between construction of the three stages of the Tower allowed
the silts and clays to compress and strengthen (because denser
soils are stronger), such that the soil was able to sustain the
loads associated with subsequent construction. By 1838, the
Tower had settled in excess of 3 meters and the base of the
tower had completely disappeared into the ground. An
architect named Gherardesca did not like the fact that people
could no longer see the base of the Tower and had a walkway
excavated around the Tower. This decision was certainly not
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a good idea from an engineering standpoint, as the removal of
ground support only accelerated the Tower inclination. By
1911, the inclination had reached 5.4 degrees; by 1990, it was
5.5 degrees, with no signs of stabilization.
Altogether, there have been 17 commissions set up to assess
the stability of the Tower of Pisa over the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. The process was always quite political
and usually resulted in no measures being implemented. The
17th commission was set up in 1990, with Professor Michele
Jamiolkowski of the Technical University of Turin as the
chair. Creation of the commission happened at a time when
memories of the collapse of the Tower of Pavia, a city located
just North of Milan, Italy, were fresh. This was certainly
helpful in overcoming political resistances that had been a
problem for previous commissions.
One of the first moves of the new commission was to reinforce
the lowest story of the Tower using prestressed steel wires.
This was done as long delays related to the politics
surrounding the work of the commission were expected, and
there was concern that the masonry composing the southern
wall of the Tower was severely overstressed. In order to
temporarily stabilize this rotation of the Tower, a posttensioned concrete ring was built around the base of the Tower
and 6000kN of lead ingots stacked on it on the north side. The
lead ingots did stabilize and even reverse the lean slightly. The
lead ingots were not intended as a permanent solution, as the
intent was always to reopen the Tower to visitation by tourists,
and the ingots were considered a visually unattractive solution.
We will return to this measure in the context of our limit state
discussion later. The commission later decided to proceed with
soil extraction from under the north side of the Tower as a
definitive solution for its stabilization.
In late 1996, pilot tests of the under-excavation technique
were done. The technique had been successfully used in the
stabilization of the Mexico City Cathedral in the 1980's. The
idea is simple (see Figure 2 22): to carefully and gradually
remove soil from underneath the north side of the Tower so
that it will settle, therefore reducing the lean. However, there
were members of the commission that had reservations about
the technique. A concern expressed by one member of the
commission was that soil under-excavation might actually
accelerate the leaning and even lead to collapse of the Tower
by removing support (load-carrying capacity) from the Tower
foundations and further stressing the already overloaded south
side. A more natural expectation (subject to considerations
discussed later), however, would be that careful, slow
extraction of soil would allow overlying soil to move down to
occupy the newly created space, moving the Tower down with
it. This is indeed what happened, for the tilt decreased sharply
with the start of drilling at the end of 1999, extending
throughout the year 2000, and finally stabilizing in 2001. The
Tower now has the same inclination it had in 1800.
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Bearing Capacity or Leaning Stability
While in 1991 it was still believed that it would take tens of
years for the Tower to reach a state of collapse, we now know
that the geotechnical experts on the commission in charge of
stabilizing the Tower came to believe in subsequent years that
there were moments of grave danger of a collapse. In fact,
according to Potts (2003), the Tower was likely dangerously
close to collapse in the 1990-91 period. However, Mitchell
(1977) argued that the factor of safety against bearing capacity
failure appeared to be sufficient at all times of the Tower's
existence (even if others have questioned by how much it
exceeded one at certain times of the Tower's life). So what
was the nature of the feared collapse of the Tower?

soil-tower response as the weight of the tower is gradually
increased for three different values of soil stiffness: G = 10su,
G = 100su, and G = 1000su. Note that, since the value of su is
the same in all three cases, the weight at which collapse would
occur would be the same if bearing capacity were the
mechanism of collapse. Instead, as shown in 9, collapse takes
place for a much lower tower weight in the case of low
stiffness (G/su = 10). It also happens quite suddenly. Why the
difference?

Fig. 21 Weight leading to collapse of the tower versus relative
stiffness G/su of the foundation soil (redrafted after Potts
2003). Used with permission from ICE Publishing.

Fig. 20 Tower with an initial lean of 0.5 degrees on top of a
Tresca soil (clay) with undrained shear strength of 80 kPa
(redrafted after Potts 2003). Used with permission from ICE
Publishing.
The beginnings of an answer lie in the Mitchell et al. (1977)
observation that the maximum shear stress at points or within
zones in the clay layer matched or exceed the estimated soil
shear strength, even if the factor of safety was equal to 2. This
indicated that a plastic zone had likely formed below the south
end of the Tower. Potts (2003) provides a simple example
that illustrates the type of collapse that the Tower of Pisa
could have experienced. This type of collapse, known as
leaning instability, is closely associated not only with the
shear strength of the soil, which we use in our bearing
capacity calculations, but also with the soil stiffness, as
represented by its shear modulus. Fig. 20 shows a tower (with
geometry quite similar to that of the Tower of Pisa) on top of a
clay with su = 80kPa. The tower is built with an initial
inclination of 0.5˚. A finite element analysis then simulates the
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Fig. 22 shows a plot of incremental displacements at the last
loading increment (just before collapse) for the case of low
stiffness. It also shows that the shear stress in the soil becomes
equal to the shear strength (forming a plastic zone, represented
as a shaded zone) in only a portion of the soil deposit, and a
plastic mechanism does not form. So how does collapse
occur? In essence, it occurs through an overturning failure.
The low stiffness of the soil as it enters the plastic range does
not provide enough support beneath the right edge of the
tower after a plastic zone forms there to balance the moment
of the weight of the tower with respect to the center of the
foundation. Contrast that with the full plastic mechanism that
forms below the tower in the high-stiffness-ratio case, shown
in Fig. 23. Here, clearly, we have a bearing capacity failure,
which is a very different mechanism from leaning instability,
hence the difference in tower weights for which these two
failures are observed.
Understanding the potential mechanism of instability for the
Tower of Pisa was not merely an academic exercise. For
example, using lead ingots on the north side of the Tower to
stabilize it, as described earlier, would only work, as argued
by Potts (2003), if the prevailing mechanism was leaning
instability, in which case the lean would reduce upon
placement of the ingots. If a bearing capacity failure had been
in progress, the ingots would actually have precipitated
failure. The same can be stated regarding underexcavation.
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methods. The evaluation of case histories using modern
methods of analysis is a useful way to show the usefulness of
these methods. In this paper, we have used finite-element limit
analysis (FELA) and the finite element method (FEM) to
reveal features of foundation engineering problems that would
not otherwise be detectable with simple methods. We have
done so without resorting to sophisticated constitutive models,
relying instead on the well-known Tresca yield surface for
clay in all three case histories and linear elasticity in the last of
three case histories examined, but in more complex problems,
certainly those involving frictional soils, more realistic soil
models would be required.

Fig. 22 Displacement field and plastic zone for soft (low-shear
modulus) soil (redrafted after Potts 2003). Used with
permission from ICE Publishing.

In the two cases in which a bearing capacity collapse was
observed, we showed that use of the bearing capacity equation
is awkward, requiring a number of assumption to make it
applicable to the problems. For example, the bearing capacity
equation does not accept soil layering (and, in fact, forms of it
exist only for either uniform strength with depth or linear
increasing strength with depth) and cannot mix sand and clay
in the same soil deposit. In the last case history, we showed
that use of the bearing capacity equation to assess the potential
collapse of a tall, leaning structure would be completely
incorrect if the ratio of soil strength to soil stiffness is high,
which means only a more sophisticated method of analysis
could realistically be used.
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